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Abstract 
 
This chapter analyses the major UK economic crises that have occurred since the 
speculative bubbles of the seventeenth century. It integrates insights from economic 
history and business history to analyse both the general economic conditions and the 
specific business and financial practices that led to these crises. The analysis suggests 
a significant reinterpretation of the evidence – one that questions economists’ 
conventional views. 
 
Crises are usually considered to be financial, but historical evidence suggests that 
their origins are often real. Real effects involve too much investment in some sectors, 
too little investment in others, and often too much investment overall. These mistaken 
investment decisions originate in flawed judgements made by entrepreneurs acting 
under the influence of simple and misleading ideas. The financial aspects of a crisis 
are often the consequences of a real crisis, aggregated by defaults on fixed-interest 
debt and the consequent dislocation of the banking system. 
 
The evidence suggests that major crises often involve excessive investment in specific 
sectors that were considered at the time to be of great strategic importance. Whilst 
some crises are caused mainly by failures of government policies, failures of 
privately-funded schemes created the most serious problems. Furthermore, whilst 
some crises were caused by wars and their aftermath, many were entirely peace-time 
phenomena. 
 
Theories of entrepreneurship are well-equipped to explain such patterns of behaviour. 
They emphasise that business decision-making is based on costly and untrustworthy 
information. Under normal conditions a diversity of opinion exists and, as a result, 
entrepreneurs are encouraged to collect detailed information on investment projects. 
But when a single opinion becomes dominant detailed information may be ignored 
and opinion alone may be used as a guide to decisions. When a reputable elite 
endorses an over-simplified view about the strategic importance of some particular 
sector many entrepreneurs may be misled, and so mistakes can be made on a large 
scale. 
 
Developing and testing a theory of this type requires source material relating to the 
state of the economy, the behaviour of elites, and the attitudes of entrepreneurs, and 
therefore benefits from the integration of economic and business history as 
exemplified in this chapter. 
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Introduction 
 
While most economists failed to predict the Banking Crisis of 2007, the crisis should 
have come as no surprise to economic and business historians. There are many 
historical precedents, including the dotcom bubble of 2000, the mortgage crisis of 
1972, and the Great Depression 1929-33, triggered by the Wall Street Crash. During 
the Baring Crisis of 1890 London banks rallied round to save a London merchant 
bank that had lent too much to the Mexican government. In 1866 the collapse of 
bankers Overend Gurney was caused by excessive speculation in railway shares. The 
sorry story of boom and bust can be traced back to the South Sea Bubble of 1720 and 
even earlier. 
 
The current crisis has been imputed to a failure in wholesale financial markets, and 
popularised as the ‘credit crunch’. On this view, the origins of the crisis are financial. 
The recession, involving sharp reductions in output and a rise in unemployment, 
represents the real consequences of these financial failings, it is said, caused by the 
contraction of business investment and consumer expenditure as borrowing becomes 
more difficult (Narian, Otket and Pazarbasiglu, 2012). 
 
This chapter suggests, however, that banking problems are often symptoms rather 
than causes of crises. The underlying problem is usually mistaken judgements made 
by business and government. These judgements typically involve the over-valuation 
of innovations, with each cycle of boom and bust being associated with the over-
valuation of a particular type of product or innovation. Investment in the innovative 
sector is excessive, and investment in other sectors becomes too low, as speculative 
funding switches sectors (Hayek, 1933). The excessive investment in the innovative 
sector fails to generate the expected profits, and over-confident entrepreneurs who 
have borrowed heavily become insolvent as a result.  
 
Overconfidence usually comes from a belief that the economy is entering a ‘new era’, 
ushered in by some distinctive radical innovation. This innovation becomes over-
valued. In the dotcom bubble internet firms were valued using ‘new era’ accounting 
principles based on sales rather than profit. The share-price boom before the Great 
Depression was justified in terms of a new era of mass advertising and mass 
production, and so on. In the nineteenth century railways were perceived to be a 
revolutionary force in shrinking space and time, while in the eighteenth century trade 
and colonisation promised perpetual monopoly profits. 
 
The perceived opportunity to profit from the new type of radical innovation creates a 
demand for financial loans. There is often international rivalry to exploit new 
innovations, so politicians get involved as well. As a result, business leaders and 
politicians induce banks to make excessive loans. Businessmen demand the loans and 
government relaxes regulations to allow them to be made. Regulations are relaxed in 
response to the political overconfidence in the innovation.  
 
A specific feature of the recent crisis is that over-valued innovations related to the 
banking sector itself. Government persuaded the public that boom and bust had been 
abolished, thanks to central bank independence and ‘light touch’ banking regulation. 
The banks, meanwhile, believed that they had made major innovations in the 
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evaluation and management of financial risk. As a result, the mistakes made by banks 
extended beyond the usual problem of over-lending, to investing in new financial 
products that they did not know how to value. Overconfidence in the banking sector 
also encouraged banks to lend to each other, thereby exacerbating domino effects in 
which the collapse of one bank led to the collapse of others.  
 
Innovation has not only a physical dimension – such as investment in new 
technologies and infrastructure – but an institutional dimension too (Schumpeter, 
1939). Chartered trading companies, turnpike trusts, joint stock railway companies, 
multinational corporations, ‘lean’ corporations, internet marketing companies and 
venture capitalists have all been important institutional innovations in their time. The 
way these institutions are designed and funded have important implications for 
financial stability. Some of these types of institution have survived, but other soon 
outlived their usefulness. Likewise new product innovations relate not only to 
manufactured products such as i-Phones but to new legal and financial products, such 
as complex financial derivatives. 
 
The timing of a crisis is often identified with the appearance of its symptoms – e.g. 
headline indicators such as rising interest rates and spreads, and falling assets prices – 
but the roots of a crisis often lie much earlier, when an underlying problem developed 
(Calamiris and Gorton, 1991; Gertler, Hubbard and Kashyap, 1991). The indicators 
move only when opinion moves, and opinion moves only with a lag - once mistakes 
have been recognised. This lag allows a crisis to build up undetected. A crisis often 
emerges as a liquidity problem, in which firms experience a shortage of cash to pay 
wages and other bills. A liquidity problem can sometimes arise in response to 
temporary disruptions, such as a strike or natural disaster, and can be resolved through 
a short-term increase in the money supply. In a crisis, however, liquidity problems 
usually disguise insolvency.  
 
Insolvency means that resources borrowed by the institution have been wasted to such 
an extent that the insurance provided by the equity holders is inadequate to repay the 
creditors. There is no short-term panacea of the kind that resolves a pure liquidity 
problem. It can take a long time to determine whether institutions are insolvent, 
because it is necessary to revalue all the assets and liabilities in its balance sheet, and 
if insolvency is revealed it can take a long time to work through the ensuing problems 
and apportion losses. Delays in working through insolvencies can delay recovery from 
a crisis. 
 
The real problems are manifested in the tangible legacy of the crisis. The legacy may 
be excess capacity in physical infrastructure – e.g. empty factories and offices, closed 
shops and half-built housing estates – or large but dysfunctional institutions -  e.g. 
conglomerate firms formed through ill-considered mergers. Excess capacity and 
flawed institutions are often concentrated in the specific sectors that led the expansion 
during the preceding boom. Excess capacity after a crisis is not just the consequence 
of the crash itself but of the errors of judgement that led to it.  
 
Methodological issues 
 
The object of this chapter is to explain why crises occur and not to pass judgement on 
those involved in them. A causal explanation may well identify guilty parties, but 
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learning lessons for the future is just as important as taking vengeance or demanding 
restitution for the past. This chapter does not therefore set out to condemn bankers, or 
others who profit from the capitalist system, but rather to explain why they behave the 
way they do. 
 
A rigorous theory of crisis will explain why crises occur when they do, and why there 
is relative normality at other times. Most orthodox economic theories erroneously 
suggest that there will never be a crisis, but unorthodox theories often suggest that 
there will be perpetual crisis, and thereby fail to explain normality. Theory needs to 
explain both crisis and normality, and to identify the conditions that govern when the 
system switches (or ‘tips’) from one state to the other. Periods of normality tend to 
persist for longer than period of crisis, and the theory should explain this too. 
 
To examine crises systemically, therefore, it is necessary to use periods of normality 
as a control. If a theory can successfully identify conditions conducive to normality, it 
should be able to derive, by exception, the conditions conducive to crisis (and vice 
versa). To implement this approach, however, it is necessary to have a rigorous 
definition of a crisis. 
 
The focus of this chapter is a crisis of coordination in a capitalist economy 
(Lachmann, 1977). Wars and natural disasters can affect an economy, but the 
breakdown of the economic system is the focus here. Instability of market prices, 
defaults on contracts, insolvency of banks and firms, and the breakdown of 
institutions are the key symptoms of a coordination crisis. Governments as well as 
firms may become insolvent if they cannot raise sufficient taxes or loans, but this 
applies only in the most severe cases (De Bonis, Giustiniani and Gomel, 1999). 
 
It is not only capitalism that is prone to crisis: crises can also affect planned 
economies – including socialist, communist and fascist ones. Failures of planned 
economies are usually attributed to over-centralisation. The same is also true of the 
failure of some empires and ancient civilisations; over-centralisation is blamed for a 
failure to adjust to adverse external conditions involving climate change, 
environmental degradation, or threats of invasion (Dark, 2001). As we shall see, 
however, over-centralisation can also occur in capitalist economies as a result of 
cultural conformity, and can lead to similar results.  
 
Crises are normally unexpected – although prophetic figures may have issued 
warnings, these will typically have been ignored by the majority of people (Calomiris 
and Gorton, 1991). By the time a crisis is recognised, the course of events cannot 
normally be reversed. Policy is therefore defensive, with a focus on damage 
limitation. Crisis situations are often unstable – responses need to be urgent, because 
the more quickly remedial treatment is administered, the better are the chances of a 
recovery (Allen and Gale, 2000). In the long run, crises may generate opportunities 
for change – e.g. social and political improvements – but in the short run it is their 
negative aspects that predominate. 
 
Prior to a crisis, people usually regard the situation as satisfactory and stable. They are 
not particularly alert to information, since they expect new information to confirm 
what they believe that they already know. They are happy to take advice because they 
see no reason to distrust it. Once a crisis develops, however, people recognise that 
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they may have been wrong, and so they scrutinise information more thoroughly. They 
discover that promises have been broken and that contracts have been repudiated. 
Reputations are lost when people realise that they have been misled by people and 
institutions that they trusted. They lose confidence in their leaders, their professional 
advisors, and in the key institutions that these people control - banks, pension funds 
and businesses. Realising how little they actually knew about the situation before the 
crisis developed, rumours therefore become rife, and people react to snippets of 
information in a way that they would never do in more normal times (Kaminsky, 
Reinhart and Vegh, 2003). 
 
Most countries have experienced a succession of crises involving weak regulation of 
banking and excessive speculation in land and property. To make the volume of 
evidence manageable, this chapter focuses on only the most serious crises. Almost all 
these crises all have a strong international dimension to them, and involve some form 
of innovation which fails to live up to expectations. As indicated earlier, many of 
these innovations are sponsored by governments as well as private firms. 
 
Speed is widely recognised as important in profiting from innovations. Monopoly 
profits accrue to the first mover (unless their move is premature) and followers may 
achieve only the normal profits available under competition.  But it is often difficult 
for rivals to know who has already moved, and there are many instances where 
competition to be first leads ultimately, and ironically, to excess capacity (Richardson, 
1960). Governments too can profit from first mover advantage. An innovative country 
can enhance its political status and international influence, whilst the politicians that 
sponsor innovations may can advance their careers and increase their popularity.  
 
The diffusion of innovations is potentially global, and is expedited when international 
trade is strong and political elites in different countries emulate each other. News of 
successful innovations travels fast, and investment fads are quickly replicated in other 
countries. Furthermore, international capital markets make it relatively easy to invest 
in innovations exported to other countries. Indeed, economic imperialism is 
predicated on this principle. Each imperial metropolis raises capital for overseas 
investment in its dependencies, and sets out to imitate the projects undertaken by its 
rivals. 
 
Table 1 lists the major crises that have affected the UK over the last four hundred 
years. An appropriate point at which to begin is the Commercial Revolution that 
started in late Elizabethan England and continued under the Stuart dynasty, whilst the 
recent credit crunch makes a suitable finishing point. The table identifies seven sub-
periods, in each of which there was a distinctive political and business culture that 
legitimated certain types of innovation. The innovations were commended for 
conferring both private benefits for investors and social benefits for the country. The 
‘big idea’ behind each type of innovation is identified in the left-hand column, 
together with the crises that developed as a result its uncritical implementation. The 
particular form of capitalism prevailing at the time is identified in the second column, 
while the institutional innovations in type of firm are set out in the third column. The 
international dimension is discussed in the right-hand column. The mid-points in time 
between successive crisis may be taken as indicative of the normality with which 
these crises are to be compared. 
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The economic analysis of crisis 
 
Entrepreneurship 
 
This section sets out an economic theory of crises that explains the most obvious 
differences between crisis and normality in the cases identified above. It is based on 
the theory of entrepreneurship (for a survey see Casson, Yeung, Basu and Wadeson, 
2006). It recognises explicitly that information is costly. Decisions have to be taken 
on the basis of incomplete information. Collecting all the information required to 
eliminate risk from any decision would be prohibitively costly. Mistakes are therefore 
inevitable. Mistakes are not necessarily irrational, however. A rational decision-maker 
facing information costs will deliberately economise on information. He will trade-off 
the cost of information against the reduction in risk that this information would 
provide. They will search for information in a systematic way, re-evaluating 
prospective information in the light of the latest information they have just received. 
They will stop their search for information at the point where the expected benefit 
from the next-most-valuable piece of information they could obtain is just equal to the 
cost of collecting it. According to this view, a rational agent runs a calculated risk of 
making mistakes. Making no mistakes at all would be inefficient because it would 
involve excessive expenditure on information. 
 
Decision-making with costly information 
 
Within this context the role of the entrepreneur is that of a specialist decision-maker. 
The classic entrepreneur establishes a firm in order to produce an innovative product, 
or exploit a new technology. This is risky because product demand is uncertain, the 
technology may have a hidden snag, and so on. Financial capital must be committed 
to buying or leasing plant and equipment and to hiring workers, and this investment 
cannot be recovered if the project fails. The entrepreneur therefore needs to feel 
confident that his judgement is right. 
 
A free enterprise economy typically has many entrepreneurs. Sources of information 
are widely distributed in the economy, and as a result people differ in their 
perceptions of a situation. One person may believe that they have recognised an 
opportunity for innovation whereas another may not. If both parties are confident of 
their views then the optimist will seek funding and the pessimist will refuse to supply 
it. On the other hand, the pessimist will not compete with the optimist because he sees 
no profit in it, and so the optimist can achieve a temporary monopoly profit if he is 
right. 
 
If an entrepreneur has limited reputation then he will have to fund most of start up 
himself. Family and friends may help, but everyone else will perceive high risk. The 
entrepreneur may approach a bank, but a traditional bank will be very cautious and 
may demand substantial collateral (such as a second mortgage) for a loan. 
Entrepreneurs with limited reputation often runs small and medium-sized family 
businesses, or are involved in professional partnerships. Although such businesses 
may be adversely affected by crises, they are rarely implicated as causes of a crisis. 
They are too small and too carefully managed to create problems for the economy as a 
whole. 
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A highly reputable entrepreneur is in a different position. People respect his 
judgement, so if he says there is an opportunity then some people will change their 
minds just because he says so. For a reputable entrepreneur, therefore, the problem is 
more one of finding projects to use the capital at his disposal than to find the capital 
for a chosen project. Indeed, successful entrepreneurs often develop into venture 
capitalists and merchant bankers because they have access to capital and develop an 
ability to evaluate other people’s projects. 
 
A highly reputable entrepreneur does not need to risk a lot of his own money in a 
venture. Other people’s money is readily available. He may need to hold some equity 
in order to reassure people that he has a personal incentive to manage well, but he can 
take much of his reward as fees and salary. In some cases, indeed, he may simply act 
as an employee of the business he has founded, receiving share options and 
performance-related salary. He may even divide his time between several different 
businesses. A reputable entrepreneur can do a lot of damage if his reputation turns out 
to be unwarranted because of the size and range of businesses he controls. He may 
also get involved in promoting a particular type of innovation, and then founding 
businesses that appeal to people who wish to invest in it, as explained below. 
 
Fashions for sector-specific projects 
 
Sometimes reputation may be gained simply from the type of project to be 
undertaken. If a reputable person, such as a conspicuously successful entrepreneur,  
announces that a certain sector has exceptional growth prospects then unknown 
entrepreneurs in the sector will also find it easier to borrow funds. In this case, 
however, the monopoly model no longer applies, because the entrepreneurs are not 
battling against scepticism in the manner described above. Unless entrepreneurs can 
restrict entry through patents or powerful brands, they will not sustain even temporary 
monopoly profit. 
 
Because of the localisation of information, entrepreneurs who invest in a fashionable 
sector may be unaware that others are doing the same. Although they are just 
following fashion, they may not realise this.  It is often difficult for a person to be sure 
exactly where their own ideas come from, and there is a potential bias to believing 
that good ideas are entirely your own. If entrepreneurs in a sector announced their 
investment plans in advance they could, in principle, be coordinated, but as they often 
them keep secret to deter imitation, the unintended replication of investment projects 
may not come to light until too late (Richardson, 1960).  
 
While a fashionable sector may well grow, competition means that the benefits will 
accrue mainly to customers (through price competition) and workers with specialist 
skills (through wage competition). Competition in product and factor markets will 
therefore subject entrepreneurs and their shareholders to a profits squeeze. In addition, 
failure to coordinate investments may result in long-run over-capacity.  
 
Opinion leadership  
 
There is also a risk that the opinion leader may be wrong in their assessment of the 
sector’s prospects. Assessments of sectors are often based on ideologies as much as 
evidence (Casson, 2006). To people who believe that science holds the key to 
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progress, a high-technology industry is a natural candidate as an innovative sector, 
whilst to those who believe in creativity and imagination, cultural and media 
industries are natural candidates too. Evidence on the potential of innovative sectors is 
often based on the performance of pioneering firms. Such evidence may be premature, 
however; success may prove short-lived and may depend on specific local factors that 
cannot be replicated throughout the sector as a whole. 
 
Opinion leaders do not necessarily disseminate their views through the popular media. 
Opinions are often most influential when people believe that they are being let into a 
secret. Opinions can cascade through social networks (Bikhchandi, Hirschleifer and 
Welch, 1992). The opinion leader disseminates his opinions personally to members of 
his elite network, whose members in turn preside over networks of somewhat lower 
status. As the opinion cascades downward, each person hears it from someone they 
know personally who is of higher status than themselves. They are therefore inclined 
to trust it. Without an accurate mental model of how social networks are structured, 
they may fail to appreciate that the same opinion is cascading down through 
numerous other networks at the same time. As a result, they may believe that they 
have privileged access to this information relative to their peers. This makes them 
more likely to act upon the opinion because they perceive a greater potential profit 
from it than in fact exists. 
 
A dishonest opinion leader may deliberately set out to exploit social networks for 
personal gain – making money for himself through a sophisticate form of pyramid 
selling.  Honest opinions can disseminate in the same way, however; indeed, an 
honest-opinion leader may be unaware of the influence they possess because they too 
have a naïve view of social network structure and do not fully appreciate how their 
opinions will be used. The key point is not the at the leader is honest or dishonest but 
their opinion may ion fact be wrong.  
 
Degree of commitment 
 
Ordinary entrepreneurs may well be influenced by an opinion-leader. Others may 
recognise that a fad is developing, but still believe that they can profit from it - by 
devising projects purely to appeal to investors. High-commitment entrepreneurs will 
not do this, but low-commitment ones will. High-commitment entrepreneurs invest in 
projects designed to satisfy customer needs, and may even aim to benefit employees 
and society too. They normally plan to remain involved with their projects until they 
retire and to hand over to a worthy successor. They will be personally involved in 
ownership, and will bear their share of any losses should the projects fail. Low-
commitment entrepreneurs, on the other hand, develop projects purely as a means of 
extracting capital gains and management fees. Their projects are designed to satisfy 
the needs of investors seeking high returns. Not only do they plan to operate the 
project in a ruthless low-cost mode, but they plan to liquidate their own investment 
before the project is complete. When projects of this nature proliferate, the legacy of a 
crisis is not so much excess capacity as no capacity at all. The fraudulent nature of 
many business failures in fashionable sectors is well attested from contemporary 
documents, although allowance must be made for the atmosphere of recrimination at 
the time that many of these documents were produced.   
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Exaggerated claims for the prospects of some innovative sector appear, from the 
evidence, to be a factor in many crises. The problem can be exacerbated in various 
ways. 
 When people believe that a certain type of project is likely to be successful, 
‘due diligence’ in appraisal is discouraged. Why invest in collecting detailed 
local information when such information will make no difference to the 
decision to proceed, and when finance is forthcoming on a relatively sketchy 
project brief? Not only does a project go ahead when it should not, but it is 
badly planned, and so produces worse results when it is completed. Lack of 
due diligence was a notable feature of some of the banking mergers and 
reorganisations that preceded (and followed) the recent crisis.  
 The economy may be thought to be in danger of stagnating if it were not for 
innovation in the fashionable sector. This means that the innovative sector 
becomes ‘the only show in town’. If there were a range of innovative sectors 
in which to invest then excessive investment in any one sector would be 
unlikely because of competition for funds. But when there is one fashionable 
sector and many unfashionable ones then the scope for excessive investment 
in the fashionable sector is much greater. The role of fashionable leading 
sectors is well attested in the historical literature, as is their role in booms and 
crises. 
 Low-commitment entrepreneurs are most likely to thrive in an economy in 
which there are a significant number of people looking to gamble. Innovations 
in fashionable sectors may well be recognised as risky, but may still appeal to 
a particular type of investor. High profits appeal to people who aspire to enter 
a social elite and need the wealth to sustain their lifestyle. Such people believe 
they will be unhappy outside the elite, and very happy inside it, and therefore 
prefer a small chance of a big reward, that will get them into the elite, rather 
than a larger chance of a smaller reward, that will leave them better off but 
still outside. It is sometimes suggested that ambitious economic migrants fit 
this profile – particularly those who have been expelled from high status roles 
in other countries and wish to recover that status in their new home country. 
 
Speculation 
 
Entrepreneurs, as shown above, compete with each other in the exploitation of 
innovations. Each entrepreneur believes that their own innovation is unique, and will 
earn a monopoly profit. In effect, the entrepreneur speculates against his critics by 
proceeding with an innovation that they will not support. He is sufficiently self-
confident to believe that he is right and they are wrong. Opinions differ, because they 
are based on different sets local knowledge. This is a normal state for a private 
enterprise economy. 
 
The notion that opinions differ, and can happily coexist, is reflected in a wide range of 
institutions in a free-enterprise economy, including a democratic political system, 
where rival ideologies co-exist, religious toleration, where rival belief systems co-
exist, and a legal system where disputes are resulted purely on the basis of factual 
evidence and legal rules rather than by reference to contested moral principles. 
 
There are other ways of using local knowledge and backing one’s judgement in order 
to make a profit. The most important is stock market speculation. Here the 
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entrepreneur’s judgement applies not to starting a business but to valuing businesses 
that have already established by other people. A speculator aims to make a capital 
gain by buying and re-selling ahead of market trends. A speculator buys shares in a 
firm they consider undervalued and re-sells at a profit when the shares are re-valued. 
Speculation can be based on fundamentals or on market sentiment (Shiller, 2000). 
Speculation based on fundamental principles is analogous to high-commitment 
entrepreneurship as described above, although applied to financial assets rather than 
real ones. The speculator believes that he has better information on the value of the 
firm than other people, and that the firm is actually more valuable than others think. 
When the truth is publicly revealed the speculator sells out and pockets his gain. 
Speculating on sentiment, however, is more akin to low-commitment 
entrepreneurship. The skill is to anticipate what other people will believe rather than 
to estimate what an asset is really worth. The speculator buys when he predicts that 
sentiment is moving in favour of the asset; he believes that other people will receive 
information which they will construe (rightly or wrongly) as indicating higher value. 
In some cases, this could be information that he himself has acquired, and has delayed 
releasing whilst he takes a position on the market. He buys when he realises that the 
information is about to appear and sells once it has done so. 
 
Speculation of this kind can have real effects because when share prices rises it is 
easier for the firm concerned to raise new capital in order to finance investment. A fad 
for shares in a particular sector will therefore stimulate investment in the sector by 
reducing the cost of capital relative to other sectors. Promoting fads is a useful way 
for speculators in sentiment to engineer profits. Since such speculators often lack 
reputation (for obvious reasons), it is useful for them to have accomplices in 
journalism and the media, in order to cloak their information with respectability. 
 
The subjectivity of wealth 
 
In conventional economic models wealth is usually treated as objective, but in fact it 
is a highly subjective concept because the value of wealth depends crucially on 
expectations of the future. As expectations are revised so the value of wealth changes 
without any change in its physical composition. The fads and fashions associated with 
innovative sectors affect not only share prices in those sectors, but also the expected 
lifetime earnings of the people employed in them. A person’s self-evaluation of their 
wealth (including unrealised capital gains that they expect to make on speculative 
investments) influence their consumption decisions – not only how much they 
consume, but also their choice of products. Talking up the prospects for a sector can 
raise subjective wealth and change consumption habits (including lifestyle choices). 
This may stimulate a consumer boom based on luxury products purchased out of 
higher profits and higher earnings. This in turn may stimulate investment in housing, 
retailing and leisure facilities – investments which appears excessive in the aftermath 
of crisis when subjective wealth has returned to more realistic levels. 
 
High subjective wealth also encourages borrowing. Many individuals, for example,  
may wish to consume immediately out of future earnings through increased use of 
consumer credit, while firms in expanding sectors may borrow instead of reinvesting 
earnings. The more confident people are about their estimated wealth, the more likely 
they are to borrow at fixed interest. The greater the burden of fixed interest, the more 
 12 
likely is insolvency later on. Thus there is a direct connection between the degree of 
confidence before a crisis and the risk of bankruptcy afterwards. 
 
While consumers may not be directly influenced by investment opportunities in the 
fashionable sector, they will be well aware of the fashion. The emergence of ‘new 
money’ in the sector, and of entrepreneurial role models featured in the media, will 
help them to appreciate where new wealth is supposedly being generated. Politicians 
are likely to get in on the act too. Business interests in the fashionable sector will 
lobby for tax breaks, and politicians will be keen to be seen to be supporting it. The 
more glamorous and exotic the product, the more support the sector is likely to get. 
The ideology of progress through science and creativity may also have political 
resonance and be used to reinforce partisan political rhetoric. 
 
Political support for the innovative sector reinforces the distortion of investment. The 
leading firms may perceive themselves as national champions that cannot be allowed 
to fail. Should excess capacity emerge they believe that they will be able to lobby for 
protection, rationalisation or subsidy. By capping downside risk it stimulates 
additional investment.  
 
The cumulative effect of these forces is to unite a business and political elite behind 
the fashionable sector. This creates an abnormal economic situation. Diversity of 
opinion, which secular liberal institutions are designed to protect, is no longer 
tolerated if it involves public criticism of the fashionable sector. Critics and whistle-
blowers of the sector find themselves ostracised by the elite. If they are influential 
they may find their personal reputation under attack. The suppression of relevant 
information helps to disguise emerging problems. Problems of potential insolvency 
are dismissed as temporary liquidity problems until they eventually become 
impossible to hide. 
 
By this stage the crisis has become a financial crisis, rather than just a crisis of 
excessive investment, and in the ensuing panic the origins of the crisis are lost from 
view. The banks take the blame for having extended credit unwisely to the 
fashionable sector, and to other sectors that have benefited from the associated 
consumer boom. This lets of the hook the entrepreneurs who invested so unwisely, as 
they appear as victims of the financial system like everyone else. Politicians too can 
lay some of the blame on the banking system, although they often pay the price of 
failure later through the political process. 
 
The implications of this analysis are summarised in Table 2. 
 
The international dimension 
 
Most UK crises have an international dimension, as Table 1 indicates. This partly 
reflects the openness of the economy, and the historical role of imperialism. The 
international dimension of crises is often used to suggest that crises originate outside 
the UK and are imported through international capital markets. The evidence 
suggests, however, that it is UK investments and political involvement in other 
countries that has often generated crises in the UK.  
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For the past four hundred years, the international economy has expanded almost 
continuously, interrupted only by wars, protectionism, and recurrent crises. This 
expansion has been sustained by a continuous extension of the international division 
of labour (Wallerstein, 1979). New discoveries result in new products, which are 
produced using increasingly specialised assets, operated by specialised workers and 
managed by professional experts. The coordination of many such specialised 
activities is a major challenge, and specialised institutions, such as multinational firms 
and international banks, have emerged to fulfil this role. 
 
Progress in the division of labour is not the product of random experimentation or 
myopic change, but of purposeful activity. Opportunities to advance the division of 
labour are recognised by entrepreneurs, who deliberately set out to find better ways of 
doing things. Inventions and discoveries result from these efforts. In some cases the 
effort may be motivated by a search for profit, or for status and celebrity, but public 
benefit may also be a motive too. Crises have developed when these efforts have been 
over-extended in the context of certain sectors. 
 
The main problems have been 
 The product or technology exploited by UK firms is fundamentally flawed, so 
that snags emerge when production is scaled up. Early chartered trading 
companies often failed because of low agricultural productivity, and schemes 
had to aborted before local infrastructure could be built (Darien, South Sea 
and Mississippi ‘bubble’ schemes) 
 The technology, though successful, is quickly superseded by a superior one. 
This is may precipitate a crisis because of the large amount of investment that 
has been sunk, and the shortness of the effective pay-back period (tramways 
superseded by buses; gas lighting and hydraulic power superseded by 
electricity). 
 Unexpected interruptions of supply due to war, expropriation of resources or 
supplier cartels may push up costs to prohibitive levels. (Imperial war defeats, 
Korean war, Oil price shock; decolonisation) 
 The technology may lack local political or social support. The host 
government may refuse to make investments in infrastructure – e.g. transport, 
communication, power supplies – that are necessary for the technology to 
flourish. Foreign ownership of the technology, or its environmental impact, 
may become a political issue. Threats to traditional working practices, and 
resistance to job loses in competing traditional industries, may lead to strikes 
and popular protest. (Baring Crisis) 
 The product or technology may be perfectly sound, but early enthusiasm may 
lead to excess supply. Failure to coordinate start-up investments may lead to 
excess capacity as each firm attempts to pre-empt rival entrants and fails. 
Enthusiasm may be fostered by strong early demand stimulated by fashion and 
novelty which soon wears off (Tulip Mania, Railway Mania, dot.com bubble)  
 
Even where the product or technology is sound, failures can still emerge if project 
coordination is weak. The progressive expansion of the international labour raises a 
host of management challenges. Poor planning was blamed for the failure of many of 
the early overseas settlement schemes. As the supply chains controlled by firms have 
become increasingly complex, so management structures have evolved – typically by 
replacing hierarchical systems controlled by autocratic managers with ‘flatter’ and 
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more flexible systems administered using a more consultative approach. These 
changes have often lagged the challenges, however, and managing complex systems 
using managerial systems that are legacies of an earlier and simpler age has been a 
regular cause of failure. 
 
Case study 
 
Case studies illustrate how a detailed analysis of crises can be carried out. This 
section summarises a case study of the UK Railway Mania. Table 1 listed major UK 
crises and Table 2 identified key aspects of these crises that can be explained by 
entrepreneurial failure. Railways represented a radical innovation (Schumpeter, 
1939); main line passenger railways were pioneered in the UK, and quickly spread to 
the US, continental Europe and European colonies in Asia, Africa and the Pacific. 
When the UK Railway Mania collapsed in 1846 many investors were ruined, and it 
took many years to complete the building of lines authorised in that year. Investment 
in railways did not recover until 1860 (Casson, 2009). 
 
Main line railways replaced canals, providing faster and more reliable transport. 
Canals had been highly profitable until the railways arrived, and many canal 
proprietors lost money from railway competition. Some canal proprietors sold out to 
railway companies, who closed their canals down to stifle potential rivalry. Railway 
proprietors, quite rightly, did not fear immediate competition from motor cars or 
aircraft, but they mistakenly ignored the threat of over-capacity on the railway system 
itself. They wrongly assumed that the railway schemes in which they invested would 
become local monopolies. 
 
The build up to the Mania began about 1842, when interest were low and the early 
main lines that had already been completed 1830-40 were earning good profits. 
Towns served by railways were booming, but towns that were by-passed were 
declining. Over-supply arose because every town wanted to be served by a railway so 
that it could share in the prosperity and avoid decline. Numerous railway schemes 
were laid before Parliament and to achieve popularity Parliament approved nearly all 
of them – far too many to be financed or constructed at any one time. Crucially, for 
almost every scheme that was authorised, one or two competing schemes were 
authorised as well, so that all hope of monopoly profit disappeared. Many investors 
wanted their money back, although much of it had already been spent on engineers’ 
and lawyers’ fees. The wealth that everyone anticipated also disappeared, and those 
that had borrowed against that wealth went bankrupt. There was no financial melt-
down, however, because railway finance was based mainly on equity rather than 
debentures. Interest rates went up, but the banking system remained stable. 
 
Many railway investors were relatively inexperienced. They underestimated network 
externalities on the railway system. They expected other lines to feed traffic onto their 
own line, but they did not expect competing lines to take traffic away. Politicians 
made matters worse; instead of wisely checking speculation, they encouraged it by 
backing high-risk schemes like Brunel’s broad gauge. The collapse of the Mania 
destroyed confidence, and led to a reaction whereby even worthwhile schemes could 
not get financed. Many schemes that had been authorised were not built until many 
years later (some never at all). Demand for construction work dried up, and 
consumers stopped spending because they suddenly realised that they were much 
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poorer than they had thought. The economy began to recover after a couple of years, 
but railway investment did not recover fully for almost twenty years. History then 
repeated itself, and a Second Railway Mania of the 1860s culminated in the dramatic 
Overend Gurney banking collapse of 1866. Once again the banking system as a whole 
survived, but investor confidence was destroyed, exactly as before. 
 
The experience of the Railway Mania corroborates the view that political elites will 
often jump on popular bandwagons rather than stifle speculation and ‘spoil the party’. 
At the time of the Mania railway technology was still developing, and network 
economies were not properly understood. Politicians ignored expert advice and 
followed popular sentiment in authorising large numbers of competing schemes. In 
the aftermath of the Mania they found convenient scapegoats in social outsiders, such 
as George Hudson, the ‘railway king’. They quickly turned their attention away from 
railways, which had become a tainted topic, and re-focused on the Corn Laws and the 
Irish potato famine instead. 
 
Implications for business and economic history 
 
This chapter has outlined an economic model of crisis that is different from the usual 
type of economic model. Unlike many cliometric models that are based on 
conventional theory, it does not assume perfect information and efficiency. Instead it 
allows for mistakes. It suggests that the frequency of mistakes increases when the 
business and political elite become obsessed with the idea of promoting investment is 
some fashionable innovative sector.  This strategy is seen by the elite as an antidote to 
potential stagnation in traditional sectors, and providing an opportunity for profitable 
stock market speculation. It also allows politicians to claim to have some sort of 
strategic plan for growth. The model can be tested by comparing clearly identified 
periods of build up to crisis with a control groups of normal situations. There is a 
series of dimensions along which the comparisons can be made. Although there are 
other theories of crisis, many of them are not easily testable because they either imply 
a continuous state of crisis, or cannot clearly identify the antecedents of crisis. 
Furthermore, these theories tend to focus on the financial indicators of crisis, most of 
which appear only after the underlying problem has already developed. They 
therefore tend to look at symptoms rather to causes and to get their timing wrong. 
 
To test the theory set out in this chapter it is necessary to combine information at 
different levels of aggregation. In contrast to conventional approaches, purely 
macroeconomic indicators are of limited significance. Investment, profits and share 
prices, for example, all need to be analysed at the sectoral level. Patterns of 
innovation need to be studied, together with the formation of firms. The histories of 
pioneering firms need to be investigated, and even biographies of leading 
entrepreneurs. Links between business, finance and government, and lobbying within 
elites, need to be explored in detail. The only way to implement this strategy is 
through a synthesis of the sources and methods of business history. Quantitative and 
qualitative analysis need to be combined - not in the form of thick description, but 
rather as a rigorous test of theory.
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Table 1: Crises originating in or impacting upon the UK, 1600-2007 
 
 
Dates Events Type of 
capitalism 
Institutional 
characteristics of 
firms 
International 
business 
operations 
1600-
1760 
Big idea: trade 
expansion 
Internal: 
Darien Scheme, 
1695, 
South Sea Bubble, 
1711 
 
External: Dutch 
Tulip Mania, 1637, 
French Mississippi 
Company Bubble, 
1719 
 
Proprietary 
capitalism 
based on natural 
products. 
Speculative 
mines and 
plantations 
 
Partnerships, family 
firms  
Local market served 
mainly by single-plant 
firms  
Formation of chartered 
joint-stock companies, 
e.g. East India 
Company, 1600,  
Hudson Bay Company, 
1670 
 
Trade through 
mercantile 
partnerships 
involving 
overseas 
agencies. Some 
wholly-owned 
trading posts 
1760-
1840 
Big idea: Industrial 
expansion 
 
Internal: 
Banking Crisis, 
1825 
 
External: US 
Panics of 1819 and 
1837 
 
Proprietary 
capitalism 
based on 
factory-made 
products 
Partnerships, family 
firms. 
National markets 
served by large 
factories making 
textiles, pottery, metal 
goods. Distribution by 
canal and turnpike 
roads 
Imports of raw 
materials and 
exports of 
finished goods 
through 
mercantile 
partnerships, with 
some direct 
export by 
manufacturers 
1840 
- 
1890 
Big idea: 
Infrastructure 
projects for 
national and 
colonial 
development 
Internal; 
Railway Manias, 
1844-46, 1860-66 
Overend Gurney 
Crisis, 1866,  
 
External: 
Disruption of trade 
by the American 
Civil War, 1861-65 
Metropolitan 
capitalism 
based on large 
joint stock 
companies 
financed 
through stock 
exchanges. 
Infrastructure  
projects 
improve 
transport 
(railways, 
harbours), 
communi-
cations 
Large joint-stock 
national firms expand 
through acquisition of 
local and regional 
firms. Active 
shareholder 
participation. 
Growth of patents, 
trademarks, and 
advertising in national 
press. 
Professional railway 
management evolves, 
based on the military 
model of an ‘officer 
class’ 
Free-standing 
companies make 
project-based 
investments in 
developing 
countries, e.g. 
Latin America, 
Australia, Asia. 
Directors are 
based in the 
metropolis and 
managers 
overseas. 
Extensive use of 
metropolitan 
engineering 
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 (telegraph), and 
urban quality of 
life (lighting, 
gas supply) 
 consultancies, 
lawyers and 
stock-brokers 
1890 
-1914  
Big idea: London 
as a centre of 
international 
finance 
 
External: 
Mexican ‘Baring 
Crisis’, 1890 
Wars of imperial 
expansion; 
occasional defeats 
Anti-capitalism: 
Social 
reformers, trade 
unionists and 
feminists 
challenge the 
inequalities 
attributed to 
monopoly 
capitalism. 
Some promote 
revolution 
whilst other 
wish to pre-
empt it.  
Merger and trust 
movements create large 
monopolistic firms. 
Aristocratic directors 
represent shareholder 
interests, and 
shareholder activism 
declines. 
Countervailing growth 
of large ‘stakeholder’ 
enterprises: mutuals 
(building societies), 
consumer co-operatives 
(retailers), employee-
owned firms and 
paternalistic family 
firms (food processors 
and retailers)  
High-imperialist 
European race for 
Africa. 
Government 
sponsorship of 
large companies 
dedicated to 
exploiting 
resources in 
conquered 
territories.  
1914- 
1945 
Big idea: Social 
justice in the 
workplace 
Internal: 
Decline of textiles 
and engineering, 
1921 
 
External: 
Wall Street Crash 
& Great Depression 
1929-33 
Regulated 
managerial 
capitalism: 
National 
champions are 
created through 
rationalisation 
movements in 
declining or 
under-
performing 
industries (e.g. 
textiles, 
chemicals) 
Protected national 
markets reduce 
international division 
of labour. 
Military anxieties 
stimulate defence-
related R&D. 
Managers emulate war-
time planners in 
centralising control 
within hierarchies. 
State offers subsidies to 
induce compliance with 
regulation. 
Political risks of 
foreign 
investment 
increase. 
International 
cross-licensing 
and patent pools 
develop, 
involving national 
champions from 
different 
countries 
1945-
1976 
Big idea: 
Consumerism 
Internal: 
IMF Crisis of 1976, 
caused by high 
public expenditure, 
strikes and Asian 
competition 
 
 
External: 
Korean War, 1951 
Welfare 
Capitalism: The 
‘Golden Age of 
Western 
Growth’. 
Managerial 
capitalism with 
passive 
shareholders. 
Firms sacrifice 
profits to link 
with big 
government and 
trades unions in 
Managerial rewards 
based on salaries 
related to size of firm, 
encouraging low-risk 
high-growth strategies. 
Firms grow 
domestically through 
regional and  industrial 
diversification. 
High income tax rates 
encourage lavish 
expensive accounts 
Firms grow 
domestically through 
US hegemony 
reduces political 
risks for Western 
foreign investors. 
Commercial-
isation of wartime 
R&D encourages 
high-technology  
foreign direct 
investment by US 
firms, using a 
hierarchical 
headquarters – 
foreign subsidiary 
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pursuit of a 
Welfare Sate 
regional and  industrial 
diversification 
structure. 
Weak intellectual 
property rights 
discourage 
licensing; foreign 
direct investment 
is preferred where 
political risks are 
low  
1973-
2007 
Big idea: 
Competition and 
incentives 
 
Internal: 
Housing market 
crisis, 1972, Dot-
com Bubble,1998-
2000 
Credit crunch, 2007 
 
External: 
Oil price shocks, 
1973, 1979 
Asian financial 
crisis, 1997 
 
  
Bonus 
capitalism: 
Shareholder 
rights, 
management 
incentives. 
Asian 
competition 
initiates radical 
policy response. 
Keynesianism 
abandoned in 
favour of free 
markets and 
monetarism. 
 
Decline of national 
champions due to low 
labour productivity and 
unrelated 
diversifications 
encourages growth of 
small proprietary firms 
through management 
buy-outs and start-ups 
by redundant 
employees. 
Privatisation of 
national and municipal 
enterprises. 
Dominant shareholders 
such as pension funds 
become more active.  
Managers are 
encouraged to take 
calculated risks by 
relating their rewards to 
share price and profits 
through bonuses and 
stock options. 
Hostile take-overs 
promote a market in 
managerial control.  
Globalisation of 
product markets: 
tariff reductions, 
container 
shipping, jet 
travel and 
motorways 
reduce barriers to 
trade. 
Globalisation of 
capital markets: 
internet 
communications,  
removal of 
exchange controls 
and ‘light touch’ 
banking 
regulation 
liberalise capital 
markets. 
Stronger 
intellectual 
property rights 
encourage 
licensing, joint 
ventures, etc. 
Resultant out-
sourcing and off-
shoring create 
‘hollowed out’ or 
‘flagship’ 
multinationals. 
 
Sources: Bernanke and James (1991), Campbell (2009), Carswell (1960), Dale, 
Johnson and Rang (2005), Dash (2001), Eichengreen (1997), Elliott (2006), Fishlow 
(1985), Freixas, Giannibni, Hogarth and Soussa (1999), Ferguson and Schularick 
(2006), Flores (2002), Garber  (2001), Garside (2007), Goldgar (2007), Insch (1947), 
Marglin and Schor (1990), Marichal (1989), Maroney, Naka and Wansi (2004), 
Michie (19850, Mitchener and Weidenmier (2006), Neal (1998), Oliver (2007), Palma 
(2003), Radlett and Sachs (1998), Rothbard, 1962, Wood (1992), Wood (1824). 
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Table 2 
 
Simple typology of the normal state of the economy and a crisis-prone state 
 
Issue Normality Crisis build-up 
Innovation Incremental  Radical 
Sources of information Diverse and local  Judgements of a new elite 
Sector Diversified One fashionable sector and 
many unfashionable ones 
Profits Numerous small 
temporary monopolies 
eroded by imitation 
Simultaneous 
uncoordinated large 
investments  
Style of investment High-commitment; 
customer focus; no plan to 
sell out 
Low-commitment; 
investor focus; plan to sell 
out 
Style of management Varied: autocratic, 
consultative, bureaucratic  
Charismatic, intolerant 
Financing Owner-managers Widely distributed 
absentee share owners.  
Entrepreneurial reward Profit stream Salary, fees, bonuses, 
options (capital gains) 
Expectations Realistic expectations 
based on modest self-
improvement 
Exaggerated expectations 
ased on high future income 
Share speculation Based on fundamentals Based on sentiment 
Political culture Plurality of views and 
effective debate 
Dominant view and weak 
demoralised opposition 
Lifestyle Identification with family, 
community, profession. 
Aspiration to join social 
elite 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
